Position Auctions with Consumer Search by Susan Athey & Glenn Ellison
POSITION AUCTIONS WITH CONSUMER SEARCH
Susan Athey and Glenn Ellison
This paper examines a model in which advertisers bid for \sponsored-link" positions on
a search engine. The value advertisers derive from each position is endogenized as coming
from sales to a population of consumers who make rational inferences about rm qualities
and search optimally. Consumer search strategies, equilibrium bidding, and the welfare
benets of position auctions are analyzed. Implications for reserve prices and a number of
other auction design questions are discussed.
I. Introduction
Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft allocate the small \sponsored links" at the top and on
the right side of their search engine results via similar auction mechanisms. Sponsored-link
auctions have quickly become one of the more practically important topics in the economics
of auctions, as annual revenues now surpass $30 billion. They have also quickly become
an important topic in the economics of advertising: they have driven the recent growth of
online advertising, which is having dramatic eects both on products that are now heavily
sold online and on the competing media that are suering in the competition for advertising
dollars. In this paper, we address issues of relevance to both elds by developing a model of
sponsored-link advertising that incorporates both standard auction-theoretic and two-sided
market considerations.
There has been a recent burst of academic papers on sponsored-search auctions spurred
both by the importance of the topic and by some very elegant results. This literature has
coined the term \position auctions" to describe the particular multi-good auction in which
per-click bidding is used to auction o n asymmetric objects with unidimensional bids.1 A
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1striking result, derived in Aggarwal, Goel, and Motwani (2006), Edelman, Ostrovsky, and
Schwarz (2007), and Varian (2007), is that the generalized second price (GSP) position
auction in which the kth highest bidder wins the kth slot and pays the k + 1st highest bid
is not equivalent to the VCG mechanism and thus does not induce truthful bidding, but
nonetheless results in the same outcome as the VCG mechanism in an interesting class
of environments. A number of subsequent papers have extended the analyses in various
important dimensions such as allowing for reserve prices, the use of weights to account
for asymmetric click-through rates, and considering more general relationships between
positions and click-through rates.2
Most of the literature, however, is squarely auction-focused and continues to abstract
away from the fact that the \objects" being auctioned are advertisements.3 We feel that
this is an important omission because when the value of a link is due to consumers' clicking
on the links and making purchases, it is natural to assume that consumer behavior and link
values will be aected by the process by which links are selected for display. In this paper,
we develop this line of analysis. By incorporating consumers into our model, we are able
to answer questions about how the design of the advertising auction marketplace aects
overall welfare, as well as the division of surplus between consumers, search engines, and
advertisers. Our framework allows us to provide new insights about reserve prices policies,
click-through weighting, fostering product diversity, advertisers' incentives to write accurate
ad text, and eects of dierent bidding mechanisms.
Section II of the paper presents our base model. The most important assumptions are
that advertisers dier in quality (with high quality rms being more likely to meet each
consumer's need), that consumers incur costs of clicking on ads, and that consumers act
rationally in deciding how many ads to click on and in what order.
Section III presents some basic results on search, welfare, and the economic role of
sponsored search advertising. We characterize optimal consumer search strategies. We note
2See, among many others, Edelman and Schwarz (2010) on reserve prices, Lehaie (2006), Liu and Chen
(2006), and Liu, Chen and Whinston (2010) on click-weights, and Borgers, Cox, Pesendorfer, and Petricek
(2006) and Aggarwal, Feldman, Muthukrishnan, and Pal (2008) on alternate click-position relationships.
3As discussed below, Chen and He (2006) is a noteworthy early exception { they develop a model with
optimal consumer search and note that the fact that auctions lead to a sorting of advertisers by quality can
rationalize top-down search and be a channel through which sponsored link auctions contribute to social
welfare.
2that a search engine that presents sponsored links should be thought of as an information
intermediary that contributes to welfare by providing information (in the form of an ordered
list) that allows consumers to search more eciently, and we present some calculations that
quantify the welfare benets.
Section IV contains our equilibrium analysis of the sponsored-link auction. Because the
value of being in any given position on the search results page depends on the qualities of
all of the other advertisers, the auction is no longer a private-values model and hence does
not t within the framework of Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz (EOS) (2007). We note,
however, that the common value elements of our model are perhaps surprisingly easy to
deal with { the analysis of EOS can be adapted with only minor modications. We are
able to provide explicit formulas describing a symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium with
monotone bidding functions, and we discuss a number of properties of the equilibrium.
We then turn to auction-design questions. These are obviously of practical interest
to rms conducting sponsored-link auctions and to policy-makers who must interpret the
actions being taken in what is a highly concentrated industry. We nd them interesting from
a theoretical perspective as well, because it is here that the fact that Google is auctioning
advertisements rather than generic objects brings up a host of new concerns. Any changes
to the rules for selecting ads will aect what consumers infer about the quality of each
displayed ad, which in turn aects the value of winning each of the prizes being auctioned.
Eects of this variety can substantially change the way one thinks about search engine
policies.
Our rst auction design section, Section V, focuses on reserve-price policies. Recall that
in standard auctions with exogenous values, reserve prices raise revenue for the auctioneer,
but this comes at a welfare cost { some potential gains from trade are not realized. In
contrast, in our model, reserve prices can enhance total social surplus, and in some cases
can even be good for advertisers. The reason is that reserve prices can enhance welfare in
two ways: they help consumers avoid some of the inecient search costs they incur when
clicking on low quality links; and they can increase the number of links that are examined
in equilibrium.4 The section also focuses on conicts (or the lack thereof) between the
4In this respect, our model is related to that of Kamenica (2008) which develops a rational alternative
3preferences of consumers, advertisers, and the search engine. Indeed, our analysis begins
with an observation that when consumer search costs are uniformly distributed (but other
aspects of the model are left quite general) there is a perfect alignment of consumer-optimal
and socially optimal policies. This observation turns out to be a nice way to bring out several
insights: we derive results on consumer and social welfare; we use it as a computational
tool; and we note that it also implies that there is an inherent conict between the search
engine and its advertisers { any departure from the socially optimal policy that increases
search engine prots must do so by reducing advertiser surplus. We also present a number
of results concerning what does and does not generalize to the case when consumer search
costs are drawn from general distributions.
Section VI examines click-weighted auctions similar to those used by Google, Yahoo!
and Microsoft. Google's introduction of click-through weighting in 2002 is regarded as
an important competitive advantage and Yahoo!'s introduction of click-through weights
into its ranking algorithm in early 2007 (\Panama") was highly publicized as a critical
improvement.5 It is intuitive that weighting bids by click-through rates should improve
eciency { surplus is only generated when consumers click on links. EOS note briey
(at the end of section III) that their eciency result extends to establish the eciency of
click-weighted auctions when click-through rates are the product of a position eect and
an advertiser eect.6 Our analysis places some caveats on this conventional wisdom about
eciency. In the presence of search costs, we show that the click-weighted auction does
not necessarily generate the right selection of ads { general ads may be displayed when it
would be more ecient to display an ads that serve a narrower population segment well.
There can also be welfare losses when asymmetries in the click-through weights make the
ordering of the ads less informative about quality. Finally, we note that the introduction
of click-weighting can create incentives for rms to write misleading and overly broad text.
The intuition for the latter result is that even though rms pay per click, in a click-weighted
to \behavioral" explanations for why demand sometimes rises when consumers are presented with a smaller
choice set.
5Eisenmann and Hermann (2006) report that Google's move was in part motivated by a desire for
improved ad relevance: \according to Google, this method ensured that users saw the most relevant ads
rst."
6Lehaie (2006), Liu and Chen (2006), and Liu, Chen, and Whinston (2010), note that while click-
weighting is ecient, a prot-maximizing search engine will typically want to choose dierent weights.
4auction, rms that generate more clicks on average must pay less per click to maintain their
position, and so they have no incentive to economize on consumer clicks. The result is also
robust to the use of pay-per-action pricing models, so long as the auction is action-weighted.
A number of results are described only informally in the text with the formal models
and analysis left to the appendices. Appendix I examines a special case in which we can
derive more explicit versions of several results. Appendices II and III develop the models
discussed in Sections V.F and VI, respectively. Appendix IV contains some omitted proofs.
We would direct readers who prefer an integrated discussion to the working paper version
of this paper, Athey and Ellison (2009).
As noted above, our paper contributes to a rapidly growing literature. Edelman, Os-
trovsky, and Schwarz (2007), Aggarwal, Goel, and Motwani (2006), and Varian (2007), all
contain versions of the result that the standard unweighted position auction (which EOS
call the generalized second price or GSP auction) is not equivalent to a VCG mechanism
but can yield the same outcome in equilibrium. Such results can be derived in the context
of a perfect information model under certain equilibrium selection conditions. EOS show
that the equivalence can also be derived in an incomplete information ascending bid auc-
tion, and that in this case the VCG-equivalent equilibrium is the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium. The papers also note conditions under which the results would carry over to
click-weighted auctions.
We have already mentioned a number of papers that extend the analysis in various
directions. Edelman and Schwarz (2010) were the rst to analyze optimal reserve prices.
They present both theoretical and numerical analyses, including a demonstration that the
GSP auction with a single, optimally chosen reserve price is an optimal mechanism. Our
work departs from theirs in our consideration of the feedbacks between auction rules, con-
sumer expectations, and the value of advertising slots, and our model provides a motivation
for reserve prices that vary with position. Two other papers are noteworthy for consider-
ing more general click-through processes and presenting empirical results. B orgers, Cox,
Pesendorfer and Petricek (BCPP) (2007) extend the standard model to allow click-through
rates and value per click to vary across positions in dierent ways for dierent advertisers
and emphasize that there can be a great multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes in a perfect
5information setting.7 Jeziorski and Segal (2009) develop a model in which consumers have
more general preferences across bundles of ads and provide both reduced form empirical
results relevant to our paper, e.g. noting that consumers do not always search in a top-
down manner and that clicks on lower ads are aected by the quality of higher ads, and
structural estimates of consumer utility parameters.
Chen and He (2006) previously developed a model that introduced several of the key
elements of our model. They assumed that consumers have needs, that advertisers have
dierent valuations because they have dierent probabilities of meeting consumers' needs,
and that consumers search optimally until their need is satised. They also included some
desirable elements which we do not include: they endogenize the prices advertisers charge
consumers; and allow rms to have dierent production costs.8 Our primary departure from
their framework is our consideration of incomplete information: we assume that advertisers'
qualities are drawn from a distribution and not known to consumers (and other advertisers).
This assumption plays a central role in many of our analyses. For example, most of our
auction design analyses hinge on how the design aects the information consumers get
about rm qualities and thereby inuences consumer search. Our paper also diers from
theirs in that much of our paper is devoted to topics, e.g. consumer welfare, reserve prices,
and click weighting, that that they do not address.
Several more recent papers have also examined issues that reect that search-engines
are auctioning advertisements. White (2008) and Xu, Chen, and Whinston (2009) develop
models that include both organic and paid search results. Xu, Chen, and Whinston (2008)
develop a model in which advertisers are also competing in prices for the goods they are
advertising and provide a number of interesting observations about how this may interact
with the willingness to bid for a higher position.
7Our model does not t in the BCPP framework either, however, because they maintain the assumption
that advertiser i's click-through rate in position j is independent of the characteristics of the other adver-
tisers. BCPP also contains an empirical analysis which includes methodological innovations and estimates
of how value-per-click changes with position in Yahoo! data. Chen, Liu, and Whinston (2009) develop a
model (without consumer search) which treats the fraction of clicks allocated to each advertiser as a design
variable.
8As in Diamond (1971) the equilibrium turns out to be that all rms charge the monopoly price.
6II. A Base Model
A continuum of consumers have a \need." They receive a benet of 1 if the need is met.
To identify rms able to meet the need they visit a search site. The search site displays M
sponsored links. Consumer j can click on any of these at cost sj. Consumers click optimally
until their need is met or until the expected benet from an additional click falls below sj.
We assume the sj have an atomless distribution G with support [0;1].
N advertisers wish to advertise on a website. Firm i has probability qi of meeting each
consumer's need, which is private information. We assume that all rms draw their qi
independently from a common distribution, F; which is atomless and has support [0;1].
Advertisers get a payo of 1 every time they meet a need.
Informally, we follow EOS in assuming that the search site conducts an ascending bid
auction for the M positions: if the advertisers drop out at per-click bids b1;:::;bN, the
search engine selects the advertisers with the M highest bids and lists them in order from
top to bottom.9 The kth highest bidder pays the k +1st highest bid for each click it gets.10
To avoid some of the complications that arise in continuous time models, however, we
formalize the auction as a simpler M-stage game in which the rms are simply repeatedly
asked to name the price at which they will next drop out if no other rm has yet dropped
out.11 In the rst stage, which we call stage M + 1, the rms simultaneously submit bids
bM1;:::bMN 2 [0;1) specifying a per-click price they are willing to pay to be listed on
the screen. The N   M lowest bidders are eliminated.12 Write bM+1 for the highest bid
among the rms that have been eliminated. In remaining stages k, which we'll index by
the number of rms remaining, k 2 fM;M   1;:::;2g, the rms which have not yet been
9EOS show that in their model the equilibrium of such an ascending auction is also the lowest-revenue
envy-free Nash equilibrium of a complete-information, simultaneous-move bidding game. Because our model
has endogenous click-through rates, the envy-free concept would require some modication to be applied to
our model.
10Note that this model diers from the real-world auctions by Google, Yahoo!, and MSN in that it does
not weight bids by click-through weights. We discuss such weighted auctions in Section VI. We present
results rst for the unweighted auction because the environment is easier to analyze. It should also be an
approximation to real-world auctions in which dierences in click-through rates across rms are minor, e.g.
where the bidders are retailers with similar business models.
11Two examples of issues we avoid dealing with in this way are formalizing a clock-process in which rms
can react instantaneously to dropouts and specifying what happens if two or more rms never drop out.
See Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) for more on extensive form specications of multi-unit auctions.
12If two or more rms are tied for the M
th highest bid, we assume that the tie is broken randomly with
each tied rm being equally likely to be eliminated.
7eliminated simultaneously submit bids bkn 2 [bk+1;1). The rm with the single lowest bid
is assigned position k and eliminated from future bidding. We dene bk to be the bid of
this player. At the end of the auction, the rms in positions 1, 2, ..., M will make per-click
payments of b2;b3;:::;bM+1 for the clicks they receive.
Before proceeding, we pause to mention the main simplications incorporated in the
baseline model. First, advertisers are symmetric except for their probability of meeting
a need: prot-per-action is the same for all rms, and we do not consider the pricing
problem for the advertiser. By focusing on the probability of meeting a need rather than
pricing, we focus attention on the case{which we believe is most common on search engines
(as opposed to price comparison sites){where search phrases are suciently broad that
many dierent user intentions correspond to the same search phrase, and so the rst-order
dierence among sites is whether they are even plausible candidates for the consumer's
needs. If we allowed for rms to set prices but required consumers to search to learn
prices, rms would have an incentive to set monopoly prices, following the logic of Diamond
(1971) and Chen and He (2006); thus, the main consequence of our simplication is the
symmetry assumption. Generalizing the model to allow for heterogeneous values conditional
on meeting the consumer's need would allow us to distinguish between the externality a
rm creates on others by being higher on the list, which is related to the probability of
meeting the need, and the value the rm gets from being in a position; we leave that for
future work.
Our baseline model assumes that advertisers receive no benet when consumers see their
ad but do not click on it. Incorporating such impression values (as in BCPP) places a wedge
between the externality created by a rm and its value to being in a given position. In
addition, consumers get no information about whether listed rms are more or less likely to
meet their needs from reading the text of their ads. In Section VI we consider extensions of
our model where the ad text of rms is informative, leading to heteroeneous click-through
rates, and its accuracy is endogenous; we also consider the eect of advertiser value for
impressions in this context.
8III. Consumer search and the economic role of
sponsored-link auctions
In this section we bring out the idea that search engines auctioning sponsored links are
information intermediaries and that one way in which they contribute to social welfare is
by making consumer search more ecient. We do so by characterizing consumer welfare
with sorted and unsorted lists. This section also contains building blocks for all of our
analyses: an analysis of the Bayesian updating that occurs whenever consumers nd that
a particular link does not meet their needs; and a derivation of optimal search strategies.
III.A. Consumer Search and Bayesian Updating
Suppose that advertisers' bids in the position auction are strictly monotone in q.13
Then, in equilibrium the rms will be sorted so that the rm with the highest q is on top.
Consumers know this, so the expected utility from clicking on the top rm is the highest
order statistic, q1:N.14 The expected payo from any additional click must be determined
by Bayesian updating: the fact that the rst website didn't meet a consumer's need leads
them to reduce their estimate of its quality and of all lower websites' qualities.
Let q1:N;:::;qN:N be the order statistics of the N rms' qualities and let z1;:::;zN
be Bernoulli random variables equal to one with these probabilities. Dene  qk to be the
expected quality of website k in a sorted list given that the consumer has failed to fulll
his need from the rst k   1 advertisers:
 qk  E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0).
Proposition 1 If the rms are sorted by quality in equilibrium, then consumers follow a
top-down strategy: they start at the top and continue clicking until their need is met or
until the expected quality of the next website is below the search cost:  qk < s. The numbers
 qk are given by
 qk = E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0)
=
R 1
0 xfk:N(x)Probfz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0jqk:N = xgdx
R 1
0 fk:N(x)Probfz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0jqk:N = xgdx
13We will see in section IV that our model does have an equilibrium in which this occurs.
14We write q
1:N for the highest value, in contrast to the usual convention in statistics, which is to call the
highest value the N
th order statistic.
9A rm in position k will receive (1   q1:N)(1   qk 1:N)G( qk) clicks.
Proof: Consumers search in a top-down manner because the likelihood that a site meets
a consumer's need is consumer-independent, and hence maximized for each consumer at
the site with the highest q. A consumer searches the kth site if and only if the probability
of success at this site is greater than s. The expected payo to a consumer from searching
the kth site conditional on having gotten failures from the rst k   1 is E(qk:Njz1 = ::: =
zk 1 = 0). (The fk:N in the formula is the PDF of the kth order statistic of F.)
QED
The special case of the model when the quality distribution F is uniform is surprisingly
tractable: there are simple closed form expressions for the  qk and this makes it possible
to give more explicit formulas characterizing consumer strategies, welfare, etc. Appendix I
presents these results.
One way to motivate interest in equilibrium consumer search rules would be to assume
that consumers are highly sophisticated and know the number N of bidders, the distri-
bution F of rm qualities, and do all the Bayesian updating. Note, however, that such
sophistication is not really necessary. In practice, consumers just need to have learned the
probabilities  q1;  q2;:::;  qM, with which they meet their needs when clicking on each link. In
practice, consumers will not get this fully right. For example, they will not know the exact
number of potential advertisers N and have learned dierent values of the  qk applicable to
each N. But we think consumers will have some ability to know whether a query is likely
to have a small or large number of potential advertisers and to have roughly learned the
probabilities conditional on some such distinctions. In our later auction design discussions
we are motivated by similar reasoning: we think that real world consumers know very little
about reserve price policies, but will eventually react to policy changes as the equilibrium
theory predicts because they will eventually learn that links have become more or less likely
to meet their needs.
III.B. Welfare Gains From Information Provision
Lists of sponsored links provides consumers with two types of information. They identify
a set of links that may meet the consumer's need, and they provide information on relative
10quality that helps consumers search through this set more eciently. To bring out this
latter source of welfare gains it is instructive to consider how consumer search would dier
if advertisements were instead presented to consumers in a random order. Dene  q = E(qi):
In that case, the consumer expects each website to meet the need with probability  q.
Proposition 2 If the ads are sorted randomly, then consumers with s >  q don't click on
any ads. Consumers with s <  q click on ads until their need is met or they run out of ads.
Expected consumer surplus is
E(CS(s)) =
(
0 if s 2 [ q;1]
( q   s)
1 (1  q)M
 q if s 2 [0;  q]





0 if s 2 [ q1;1]
 q1   s if s 2 [ q2;  q1]
::: :::
 q1 +  q2(1    q1) + ::: +  qk
Qk 1
j=1(1    qj) if s 2 [ qk+1;  qk]
Proof: When links are not sorted equilibrium search is straightforward. Consumers
with s >  q never click. Consumers with lower s will click on links until their need is met or
they exhaust the list. They get ( q   s) from the rst search. If this is unsuccessful (which
happens with probability (1  q)) they get ( q s) from their second search. The total payo
is ( q   s)(1 + (1    q) + (1    q)2 + ::: + (1    q)M 1):
The payos in the sorted list are computed similarly, but reect that the searches occur
in a top down manner and stop endogenously as described Proposition 1.
QED
Comparing the two expressions brings out the welfare gains. Consumers with s 2 [ q;  q1]
get no utility at all from an unsorted list but positive utility from a sorted list because the
higher quality of the top links makes clicking worthwhile. Consumers with low search costs
also benet from the sorted list because they nd what they want more quickly. One case
in which this is particularly clear is when N is very large. In that case, consumer surplus
is approximately 1   s in the with a sorted list (provided F has full support so that the
highest order statistic is very close to one) and approximately 1   s= q with an unsorted
list because approximately 1= q searches are needed to nd an advertiser that can meet the
11consumer's need. Appendix I gives some more explicit expressions and a comparative graph
for the case where the quality distribution, F, is uniform.
IV. Equilibrium of the Sponsored Search Auction
In this section we solve for the equilibrium of our base model taking both consumer
and advertiser behavior into account. We restrict our attention to equilibria in which
advertisers' bids are monotone increasing in quality, so that consumers expect the list of
rms to be sorted from highest to lowest quality and search in a top-down manner.15
IV.A. Equilibrium in the Bidding Game
Consider our formalization of an \ascending auction" in which the N rms bid for the
M < N positions. When clicked on, rm i will be able to meet a consumer's need with
probability qi. We have exogenously xed the per-consumer prot at one, so qi is like the
value of a click in a standard position auction model.
Although one can think of our auction game as being analogous to the EOS model, but
with endogenous click-through rates, the auction part of our model does not t directly
within the EOS framework. The reason is that the click-through rates are a function of the
bidders' types as well as of the positions on the list.16 The equilibrium derivation, however,
is similar to that of EOS.
Our rst observation is that, as in the EOS model, rms will bid up to their true value to
get on the list, but will then shade their bids in the subsequent bidding for higher positions
on the list.
In the initial stage (stage M +1) when N > M rms remain, rms will get zero if they
are eliminated. Hence, for a rm with quality q it is a weakly dominant strategy to bid q.
We assume that all bidders behave in this way.
15In a model with endogenous search there will also be other equilibria. For example, if all remaining
bidders drop out immediately once M rms remain and are ordered arbitrarily by an auctioneer that cannot
distinguish among them, then consumers beliefs will be that the ordering of rms is meaningless, so it would
be rational for consumers to ignore the order in which the rms appear and for rms to drop out of the
bidding as soon as possible.
16BCPP have a more general setup, but they still assume that click-through rates do not depend on the
types of the other bidders.
12Once rms are sure to be on the list, however, they will not want to remain in the
bidding until it reaches their value. To see this, suppose that k rms remain and the k+1st
rm dropped out at bk+1. As the bid level b approaches q; a rm knows that it will get
q   bk+1 per click if it drops out now. If it stays in and no one else drops out before b
reaches q; nothing will change. If another rm drops out at q   , however, the rm would
do much worse: it will get more clicks, but its payo per click will just be q   (q   ) = .
Hence, the rm must drop out before the bid reaches its value.
Assume for now that the model has a symmetric strictly monotone equilibrium in which
drop out points b(k;bk+1;q) are only a function of (1) the number of rms k that remain;
(2) the current k + 1st highest bid, bk+1; and (3) the rm's privately known quality q.17
Suppose that the equilibrium is such that a rm will be indierent between dropping
out at b(k;bk+1;q) and remaining in the auction for an extra db and then dropping out
at b(k;bk+1;q) + db. This change in the strategy does not aect the rm's payo if no
other rm drops out in the db bid interval. Hence, to be locally indierent the rm must
be indierent between remaining for the extra db conditional on having another rm drop
out at b(k;bk+1;q). In this case the rm's expected payo if it is the rst to drop out is
E

(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)(1   q)jqk 1:N = q

 G( qk)  (q   bk+1):
The rst term in this expression is the probability that all higher websites will not meet a
consumer's need. The second is the demand term coming from the expected quality. The




(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)jqk 1:N = q

 G( qk 1)  (q   b):
The rst two terms in this expression are greater reecting the two mechanisms by which
higher positions lead to more clicks. The nal is smaller reecting the lower markup.
Indierence gives
G( qk)(1   q)(q   bk+1) = G( qk 1)(q   b)
This can be solved for b.
17In principle, drop out points could condition on the history of drop out points in other ways. One can
set b
k+1 = 0 in the initial stage when no rm has yet to drop out.
13Proposition 3 The auction game has a symmetric strictly monotone pure strategy equi-




q if k > M




G( qk 1)(1   q)

if k  M:
(1)
Sketch of proof: First, it is easy to show by induction on k that the strategies dened
in the proposition are symmetric strictly monotone increasing and always have qi  bk+1
on the equilibrium path. The calculations above establish that the given bidding functions
satisfy a rst-order condition.
To show that the solution to the rst-order condition is indeed a global best response we
combine a natural single-crossing property of the payo functions { the marginal benet of
a higher bid is greater for a higher quality rm { and the indierence on which the bidding
strategies are based. For example, we can show that the change in prots when a type q0
bidder increases his bid from b(q0) to b(^ q) is negative using



















This argument is formalized in Appendix IV.
QED
Remarks
1. In this equilibrium rms start out bidding up to their true value until they make it
onto the list. Once they make it onto the list they start shading their bids. If q is
close to one, then the bid shading is very small. When q is small, in contrast, bids
increase slowly with increases in a rm's quality because there isn't much gain from
outbidding one more bidder.
2. The strategies have the property that when a rm drops out of the nal M; it is
common knowledge that no other rm will drop out for a nonzero period of time.
143. Bidders shade their bids less when bidding for higher positions, i.e. b(k;b0;q) is
decreasing in k with b0 and q xed, if and only if
G( qk 1)
G( qk) is decreasing in k. This can
be seen most easily by rewriting (1) as
b = q  
G( qk)
G( qk 1)
(1   q)(q   bk+1):
One may get some intuition for whether the condition is likely to hold in practice
by examining the growth in click-through rates as a rm moves from position k to
position k 1. In the model this is
G( qk 1)
(1 qk 1:N)G( qk), and industry sources report that it
decreases moderately to rapidly in k, which is consistent with less bid shading at the
top positions. However, since qk:N is also declining in k, the declining click-through
rates could also be due to rapidly decreasing quality lower down the list.
4. EOS show that the similar equilibrium of their model is unique among equilibria in
strategies that are continuous in types and note that there are other equilibria that
are discontinuous in types. The indierence condition we derive should imply that
equilibrium is also unique in our model if one restricts attention to an appropriate class
of strategies with continuous strictly monotone bidding functions. As Chen and He
(2006) also note, however, there are also other equilibria. For example, if consumers
believe that the links are sorted randomly (and therefore search in a random order),
then there will be an equilibrium in which all rms drop out as soon as M rms
remain.
V. Reserve Prices
We now turn to questions of auction design. Such questions are of practical interest for
three reasons: they are of interest to rms designing auctions; auction design also aects
the welfare of consumers and advertisers; and antitrust and regulatory authorities will need
to understand both the incentives and welfare eects in order to interpret actions in what
is a concentrated industry. Auction design questions in our model are also interesting
theoretically because the standard principles of auction design can be substantially altered
by the fact that changes to the auction design aect consumer beliefs about the quality of
15sponsored links and thereby aect the \values" of prizes that are being auctioned. In this
section we discuss a common and important design decision: the setting of reserve prices.
In a standard auction model reserve prices increase the auctioneer's expected revenues.
At the same time, however, they reduce social welfare.18 Here, we show that the consid-
erations are somewhat dierent in our model: reserve prices can increase both the prots
of the auctioneer and social welfare. The reason for this dierence is that consumers incur
search costs on the basis of their expectation of rm quality. When the quality of a rm's
product is low relative to this expectation, the search costs consumers incur are inecient.
By instituting a reserve price, the auctioneer commits not to list products of suciently low
quality and can reduce this source of welfare loss. This in turn, can increase the number
of searches that consumers are willing to carry out. Increases in the volume of trade are
another channel through which welfare can increase.
Most of this section examines the special case of consumer search costs being uniformly
distributed on [0;1] (in fact, our results generalize to the case where the search cost dis-
tribution takes the form G(s) = sd, but we focus on the uniform case for simplicity of
exposition).19 By specializing the search cost distribution, we are able to derive a neat the-
orem on the alignment of interests that is very general on other dimensions. This allows us
to provide some complete characterizations and it is also a nice way to highlight forces that
will remain present in more general specications. Section V.F contains some results on
general search cost distributions, illustrating some results that are robust and highlighting
forces that can make others change.
V.A. An Alignment Theorem
In this section, we assume that the distribution G of search costs is uniform (without
making assumptions about the advertiser quality distribution). We present a striking result
on the alignment of consumer and advertiser/search engine preferences: the welfare maxi-
18The reduction in the gains from trade could inhibit seller or buyer entry in a model in which these were
endogenous, so reserve prices might not be optimal in such models. See Ellison, Fudenberg and M obius
(2004) for a model of competing auction sites in which this eect would be important.
19We also restrict our analyses to equilibria like those described in the previous section in which rms use
strictly monotone bidding strategies and bid their true value when they will not be on the sponsored link
list.
16mizing and consumer surplus maximizing policies coincide. Moreover, for any reserve price,
the sum of advertiser prot and search engine prot is twice the consumer surplus. The
intuition for the result can be given as follows. First, producer surplus and gross consumer
surplus (ignoring search costs) are both determined by the probability that consumers have
their needs satised. Second, consumers search optimally, so that their search intensity and
thus average search costs increase with their (perceived) probability that their need will be
met. Third, when the search cost distribution takes the form G(s) = sd, average search
costs increase with the probability that their need will be met in a constant proportion.
Finally, the third fact implies that consumer surplus net of search costs is also proportional
to the probability that needs are satised.
Proposition 4 Suppose the distribution of search costs is uniform. Consumer surplus
and social welfare are maximized for the same reserve price. Given any bidding behavior
by advertisers and any reserve price policy of the search engine, equilibrium behavior by
consumers implies E(W) = 3E(CS).
Proof: Write GCS for the gross consumer surplus in the model: GCS = CS + Search
Costs.20 Write GPS for the gross producer surplus: GPS = Advertiser Prot + Search-
engine prot. Because a search produces one unit of GCS and one unit of GPS if a consumer
need is met and zero units of each otherwise we have E(GCS) = E(GPS).
Welfare is given by W = GCS +GPS  Search Costs. Hence, to prove the theorem we
only need to show that E(Search Costs) = 1
2E(GCS). This is an immediate consequence
of the optimality of consumer search and the uniform distribution of search costs: each ad
is clicked on by all consumers with s 2 [0;E(qjX)] who have not yet had their needs met,
where X is the information available to consumers at the time the ad is presented. Hence,




20More precisely, GCS is the population average gross consumer surplus. It is a random variable, with
the realized value being a function of the realized qualities. The other measures of welfare and consumer
and producer surplus we discuss should be understood similarly.
171. Note that the alignment result does not require any assumption on the distribution
F of rm qualities and is thus fully general in this dimension.
2. The alignment result does not depend on the assumption that consumers and ad-
vertisers both receive exactly one unit of surplus from a met need. If advertisers
receive benet  from meeting a consumer's need, then E(W) = (1
2 + )E(GCS) =
(1 + 2)E(CS):
3. The alignment result with uniform search costs is a special case of a slightly more
general result. If the search cost distribution is G(s) = sd, then welfare and consumer
surplus are proportional with E(W) = (2 + 1
d)E(CS). The argument is similar and
uses the fact that E(sjs  q) remains proportional to q for this family of distributions.
(E(sjs  q) = q=(d + 1).)
4. The alignment result pertains to producer surplus, but it does not say anything about
the distinct reserve price preferences of advertisers and search engines. As shown in
more detail in the next section, advertisers and the search engine are typically in
conict with one another and with consumers about the level of reserve prices.
Our next result is a corollary which points out that commitment problems are absent
in one particular (and infrequently studied) case: it shows that a search engine that has
consumer-surplus maximization as its objective function would choose the socially optimal
reserve price even if the search engine lacked the ability to commit to a reserve price. One
may initially wonder why we are bothering to point out this lack of a commitment problem.
We have three motivations: it highlights a contrast between consumer-surplus maximizing
search engines and search engines with other objective functions; the consumer-surplus
maximization objective function may have some practical relevance in the search engine
industry; and the corollary also turns out to be a useful technical tool. We will elaborate
on these after presenting the result.
Corollary 1 Suppose the distribution of search costs is uniform. Suppose that reserve
price rW maximizes social welfare when the search engine has the ability to commit to a
reserve price. Then, rW is an equilibrium choice for a consumer-surplus maximizing search
18engine regardless of whether the search engine has the ability to commit to a reserve price.
Proof: Proposition 4 says directly that rW will be chosen if the search engine has com-
mitment power. The fact that a CS-maximizing search engine won't have a commitment
problem is less obvious, but nearly as immediate once one sets up the argument.
Write CS(q;q0) for the expected consumer surplus if consumers believe that the search
engine displays a sorted list of all advertisers with quality at least q, but the search engine
actually displays all advertisers with quality at least q0. If consumers expect that the
search engine is using reserve price rW, then the CS-maximizing search engine gets payo
CS(rW;rW) if it indeed uses rW and CS(rW;q0) if it deviates and uses reserve price q0
instead. We can see that the deviation is not protable by a simple two-step argument:
CS(rW;q0)  CS(q0;q0)  CS(rW;rW). The rst inequality is a consequence of consumer
rationality { holding the policy xed consumers do best if they know the policy and therefore
act in the way that maximizes their payo. The second is the conclusion of Proposition 4.
QED
We noted above that one motivation for presenting Corollary 1 is that it highlights that
prot-maximizing (or social welfare maximizing) search engines would have a commitment
problem. An intuition for this is that consumers do not internalize the potential prots that
advertisers and the search engine will get when they consider whether to click on a website.
Hence, holding consumer expectations xed, a deviation to a reserve price slightly lower
than what consumers are expecting would typically increase prots (and social welfare)
by leading consumers to click on more links. In equilibrium, of course, the search engine
cannot benet from deviating from the policy that consumers believe it to be using, so we
end up with an equilibrium in which the search engine is worse o. The contrast between a
consumer-surplus maximizing and a social-welfare maximizing search engine is interesting:
an incentive to try to increase the broader welfare measure ends up reducing social welfare
relative to what happens if the search engine acts to maximize just consumer surplus.
A second motivation for presenting Corollary 1 is that the behavior of consumer-surplus
maximizing rms could be directly relevant in the search engine application. Search engines
19are engaged in dynamic competition to attract consumers. If current market shares are
sensitive to the consumer surplus a search engine provides, higher current market shares
lead to higher future market shares, and future prots are important relative to foregone
current prots, then designing a search engine to maximize consumer surplus may be a
rough rule-of-thumb approximation to the optimal dynamic policy of a rm competing
aggressively for consumers.
A nal motivation for presenting Corollary 1 is that it turns out to be a useful com-
putational tool. Corollary 1 implies that we can nd the policy that maximizes the social
welfare function by nding the equilibrium policy in the no-commitment model with a
consumer-surplus maximizing search engine. The latter turns out to provide an easier path
to some results.
V.B. Socially Optimal Reserve Prices with One-Position Lists and Uniformly Distributed
Search Costs
To bring out the economics of setting reserve prices and the tradeos for the welfare of
participants, we rst consider the simplest version of our model: when the position auction
lists only a single rm (M = 1). In this case, if the auctioneer commits to a reserve price
of r; then consumers' expectations of the quality of a listed rm is





Because consumers with s 2 [0;E(q1:Njq1:N > r)) will examine a link if it is presented, the
average search cost of searching consumers is 1
2E(q1:Njq1:N > r). In the no-commitment
model, a consumer-surplus maximizing search engine will only display a link if the net
benet to consumers is positive. This implies that it will display links with quality at
least 1
2E(q1:Njq1:N > r). Equilibrium in the no-commitment model therefore requires that
r = 1
2E(q1:Njq1:N > r). By Proposition 4 and Corollary 1 we then have:
Proposition 5 Suppose that the list has one position and that the distribution of search
costs is uniform. Then, consumer surplus and social welfare are maximized for the same




E(q1:Njq1:N  r): (2)
20Remarks
1. Note that the formula (2) applies for any advertiser-quality distribution, not just
when advertiser qualities are uniform. Providing a general result is easier here than
in some other places because with lists of length one it is not necessary to consider
how consumers Bayesian update when links do not meet their needs.
2. For any quality distribution F with full support on [0;1] we will have E(q1:Njq1:N >
r)  1 for N large. Hence, for N large the optimal reserve price will be close to 1
2.
3. The probability that a link is displayed is 1 F(r)N. The mass of consumers who will
click on a link if one is displayed is E(q1:Njq1:N > r). Hence, a formula for expected
consumer surplus given an arbitrary reserve price r is:
E(CS) = (1   F(r)N)G( q1(r))
 





E(q1:Njq1:N > r)2(1   F(r)N):
V.C. Welfare and the Distribution of Rents
We noted above that that expected consumer surplus and expected producer surplus are
proportional, and hence maximized at the same reserve price. The \producer surplus" in
that calculation is the sum of search engine revenue and advertiser surplus. In this section
we note that these two components of producer surplus are less aligned: search engines may
prefer a reserve price much greater than the social optimum and advertisers may prefer a
reserve price much smaller than the social optimum.21
The producer surplus in our model, GPS(r), is a sum of two terms: advertiser surplus
AS(r); and search-engine prot SR(r). First, we note that a general result on preference
conicts is another simple corollary of our alignment theorem.
Proposition 6 Consider the model with uniformly distributed search costs. Suppose that
the reserve price r that maximizes the search engine's expected prot does not coincide with
21Edelman and Schwarz (2010) illustrate this preference divergence in simulations for the case they study,
exogenous click-through rates.
21the socially optimal reserve price rW. Then, both consumers and advertisers are worse o
under the prot-maximizing reserve price, i.e. E(CS(r)) < E(CS(rW)) and E(AS(r)) <
E(AS(rW)).
Proof: If r and rW do not coincide then E(W(r)) < E(W(rW)). The fact that
expected consumer surplus is lower at r than at rW is an immediate corollary of Proposition
4: E(CS(r)) = 1
3E(W(r)). The advertiser surplus result is nearly as easy. The fact that
E(GPS(r)) = 2
3E(W(r)) for any r gives E(GPS(r)) < E(GPS(rW)). Gross producer
surplus is the sum of advertiser surplus and search engine prot. The latter is higher at r
than rW, so it must be that advertiser surplus is lower at r than at rW.
QED
In the special case where the search engine displays only a single link we can get some
additional insight by writing out an explicit division-of-surplus function:
E(SR(r)) = (1   F(r)N)G( q1(r))E(max(q2:N;r)jq1:N  r)
= (r)E(GPS(r))
E(AS(r)) = (1   (r))E(GPS(r));





The (r) function has r  (r)  1 and hence satises limr!1 (r) = 1 for any quality
distribution, i.e. the search engine gets almost all of the (very small) surplus when the
reserve price is very high. For many distributions, including the uniform, the (r) function
is strictly increasing on [0;1], although this is not true for all distributions.22 When the
division of surplus function (r) is increasing in r, the prot-maximizing reserve price for
the search engine is greater than the social optimum.23
22The (r) function is also increasing when F(r) = r
 for any  > 0. A simple example to show that it
is not always increasing would be a two point distribution with mass 1    on q =
1
2 and mass  on q = 1.
For this distribution we have (
1
2)  1 and (
1
2 + ) 
1
2.
23More precisely, the prot-maximizing reserve price is always weakly greater than the social optimum
if (r) is weakly increasing and strictly greater if one assumes other regularity conditions. For example, if
E(CS(r)) is dierentiable at the social optimum and (r) has a nonzero derivative at this point.
22In Section V.A we noted that consumer-surplus maximization might be a reasonable
approximation to the objective function of a search engine in a competitive dynamic en-
vironment. If a search engine instead maximizes a weighted average of consumer surplus
and prot and the consumer surplus and prot functions are single-peaked, then a lesser
weight on consumer surplus will result in a reserve price that is worse for social welfare,
consumers, and advertisers, but better for the search engine. This comparison could be
relevant for evaluating changes in industry structure that make search engines less willing
to invest in attracting consumers instead of maximizing short-run prots.24 Appendix II.D
presents a gure illustrating the magnitudes of the welfare changes in a couple examples.
V.D. Optimal Reserve Prices with M Position Lists
Thinking about the socially optimal reserve price as the equilibrium outcome with a
consumer-surplus maximizing search engine is also useful in the full M position model.
Holding consumer expectations about the reserve price xed, making a small change dr
to the search-engine's reserve price makes no dierence unless it leads to a change in the
number of ads displayed. We can again solve for the socially optimal r by nding the
reserve price for which an increase of dr that removes an ad from the list has no impact on
consumer surplus.
The calculation, however, is more complicated than in the one-position case because
there are two ways in which removing a link from the set of links displayed can aect
consumer surplus. First, as before there is a change in consumer surplus from consumers
who reach the bottom of the list and would have clicked on the nal link with q = r if it
had been displayed, but will not click on it if it is not displayed. The benet from these
clicks would have been r. The cost would have been the search cost, which is one-half of
the average of the consumers' conditional expectations of q when considering clicking on
the nal link on the list. Second, not displaying a link at the bottom of the list will reduce
consumer expectations about the quality of all higher-up links, and thereby deter some
consumers from clicking on these links. Any changes of this second type are benecial:
24For practical application one would also want to augment the model to include xed costs that advertisers
must pay to participate. There would then be additional eects that stem from the search engine's willingness
to invest in attracting advertisers.
23when the list contains m < M links, consumer expectations when considering clicking on
the kth link, k < m are E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0;qm:N > r;qm+1:N < r). If the nal link
is omitted, consumer beliefs will change to E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0;qm 1:N > r;qm:N <
r). This latter belief coincides with E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0;qm 1:N > r;qm:N = r).
Hence, by not including the marginal link, consumers will be made to behave exactly as
they would with correct beliefs about the mth rm's quality.
We write pm(r) for the probability that the mth highest quality is r conditional on one
of the M highest qualities being equal to r. The discussion above shows:
Proposition 7 Suppose the distributions of search costs and rm qualities are uniform.
For any N and M, the welfare-maximizing reserve price r is the solution to the rst-order
condition
@E(CS)





pM(r)E(qM:NjqM:N > r) +
M 1 X
m=1
pm(r)E(qm:Njqm:N > r;qm+1:N < r)
!
:
V.E. More General Policies
In the analysis above we considered policies that involved a single reserve price that
applies regardless of the number of links that are displayed. A search engine would obviously
be at least weakly better o if it could commit to a policy in which the reserve price was a
function of the position. For example, a search engine could have the policy that no ads will
be displayed unless the highest bid is at least r1, at most one ad will be displayed unless
the second-highest bid is at least r2, and so on. A rough intuition for how such reserve
prices might be set (from largely ignoring eects of the second type noted in the previous
section) is that reserve prices should be set so that the reserve price for the mth position is
approximately (but greater than) one-half of consumers' expectations of quality when they
are considering clicking on the mth and nal link on the list. This suggests that declining
reserve prices may be better than a constant reserve price.25
The idea of using more general reserve prices illustrates a more general idea: as long
as an equilibrium in which advertisers' qualities are revealed still exists, consumer surplus
25This contrasts with Edelman and Schwarz (2010), who show that a single reserve price is optimal for
all positions when clicks are exogenous.
24(and hence welfare) is always improved if consumers are given more information about the
advertisers' qualities. In an idealized environment, the search engine could report inferred
qualities along with each ad. In practice, dierent positionings might be used to convey
this information graphically. One version of this already exists on the major search engines:
sponsored links are displayed both on the top of the search page and on the right side. The
top positions are the most desired by advertisers, but they are not always lled even when
some sponsored links are being displayed on the right side, due in part to dierent reserve
prices for the top positions and the side positions.
V.F. Reserve Prices under General Distributions
The above analyses of reserve prices assume that consumer search costs are uniformly
distributed. When search costs are not uniformly distributed, the consumer optimal and
socially optimal reserve prices will no longer exactly coincide. Appendix II presents three
results illustrating how results may change with general search costs.
First, we note that the conclusion that the consumer-optimal reserve price positive is
fully robust: it holds for any search cost distribution. Second, we note that the socially-
optimal reserve price is not necessarily positive. An intuition for why this conclusion may
change builds on our earlier comment that consumers do not take into account rm prots
when they choose whether to click on a link. In some situations increasing the reserve price
can (counterintuitively) make consumers less likely to click on links, and this can reduce
welfare. Third, we note that the search-engine optimal reserve price can also be zero. The
eect that makes this possible is that by making consumers more willing to click on lower-
ranked links, the institution of a reserve prices can reduce the incentive that rms have to
bid for higher positions.
The examples we use to show that reserve prices can reduce reduce search engine prots
and social welfare are highly special examples. Our motivation for presenting them is not
to suggest that the outcomes that occur in them are likely to occur in practice, and we
emphasize that consumer and social preferences will be roughly aligned whenever the search
cost distribution is approximately uniform or approximated by any CDF of the form G(z) =
z. Our motivation for presenting the examples is instead to illustrate the mechanisms
25that drive them so that readers may be aware of them in case they are important in some
situations.
VI. Click-weighted Auctions
Around 2003 Google was the rst to implement a modied position auction: it assigned
each advertisement i a quality score wi; ranked bids on the basis of the product biwi
rather than on bi alone; and modied per-click payments to reect dierences in the quality
scores. This modication was tremendously important in practice: the textbook unweighted
position auction let obviously \wrong" bidders winning most auctions. For example, sites
selling ringtones and pornography sites might outbid camera stores for the right to be
listed when consumers search for \digital cameras." Although most consumers searching for
digital cameras have no interest in buying ringtones or pornography, ringtone merchants and
pornographers may get higher per click prots than camera stores because prot margins are
high in ringtones and pornograpy, and the few people who click on the ads are reasonably
likely to purchase. Such an outcome would be highly inecient: consumer surplus is very
low; and neither the search engine nor the advertising merchants make much money because
the number of clicks is so low.
The simplest rule-of-thumb for choosing weights that is often mentioned in the literature
is that they can be set equal to the predicted click-through rate of the advertisement.26 The
rough motivation for this is straightforward: weighting bids by their click-through rates is
akin to ranking them on their contributions to search-engine revenues.27 In this section we
develop a extension of our model with observably heterogeneous rms and use it to examine
the implications of click-through weighting. We note that the argument for click-through
weighting is not straightforward in our environment and identify several considerations that
rms will want to take into account in designing a weighting scheme.
VI.A. A Model of Click-Weighting
26See BCPP (2007) and Jeziorski and Segal (2009) for empirical evidence on the magnitude of dierences
in click-through rates and many other insights.
27In practice, weights are the output of highly complex algorithms that may incorporate many other
factors in addition to predicted click through rates. Search engines invest a great deal in trying to improve
these algorithms, which are seen as a source of competitive advantage.
26To create a model in which click-weighting in natural we modify our model to allow
each rm to have a two-dimensional type (;q). A rm of type (;q) is able to meet the
needs of a fraction q of consumers. Consumers get some information about whether a rm
can meet their need at zero cost by looking at the ad. A fraction 1    immediately learn
that the advertiser cannot meet their need. The remaining  fraction learn that the rm
might meet their need. If they click, the rm will meet their need with probability q. As
before, consumers incur a cost of s if they click on an ad to learn whether it in fact meets
their need. Whether each rm can potentially help a consumer is independent across rms.
We assume that the  of each ad is known to the search site and to consumers. As before
each site's q is private information.
One example that readers could keep in mind is a consumers who has searched for
\shoes". The text in some sponsored links will reveal that the store in question serves only
women or sells only athletic shoes. This immediately tells some consumers that the link
would not meet their need. A store that potentially serves all consumers would have a large
. A store that serves a small niche, e.g. ballroomdancingshoes.com, would have a small .
In this environment a click-weighted auction could use the 's as the weights. Firms
submit per-click bids b1;:::;bN.28 The winning bidders are the M bidders for which ibi
is largest. They are ranked in order of ibi. If rm i is in the kth position, its per-click
payment is the lowest bid that would have placed it in this position, k+1bk+1=i.29
VI.B. Ineciencies of the Click-Weighted Auction
In some models without explicit consumer search costs it is obvious that a click-weighted
auction is ecient. Things are not so obvious in our model. We note in this section that
the click-weighted auction is ecient in one limiting case, but that otherwise there are at
least two distinct sources of ineciency.
Our eciency result is that the outcome approximates the rst best in the limit as
28Again, we can think of this informally as an oral ascending bid auction, but our formalization will be
as a multistage game as in our base model.
29Note that as in our earlier discussions of bids we use subscripts as indexes when the index is a rm
identity and superscripts as indexes when the index is the rank of the rm in the bidding, e.g. 1 is the
click-through weight of rm 1 and 
3 is the click-through weight of the rm that is the third-to-last to drop
out (in the weighted bidding).
27search costs become negligible.
Proposition 8 In the limit as s ! 0, social surplus of the click-weighted auction converges
to the rst-best.
The argument for this has two steps, but is straightforward. The rst step is to note
that the rms that win places on the sponsored-link list will be the M rms for which iqi
is largest. To see this, note that rms must bid up to qi if it is necessary to get on the
sponsored-link list because the rms get a zero payo if they do not make the list. The
second step is note what makes consumers best o in the limiting case is to have the highest
probability of meeting their need. The probability of nding a match is 1 
QM
k=1(1 kqk).
This is maximized when the listed rms are those for which iqi is largest.
The above eciency result is, however, limited by two other observations:
 The set of rms on the sponsored-link list is not necessarily optimal away from the
s ! 0 limiting case.
 Even in the s ! 0 limit the ordering of the sponsored-link list may not provide con-
sumers with as much information about advertiser quality.
In more detail, the rst observation is that social welfare will sometimes be improved if
some rms are replaced by other rms with higher q's. This can be an improvement if
the reduction in the number of needs met is more than outweighed by a saving of search
costs. The ineciency is most stark when M is large and set of advertisers consists of
both high-quality specialist rms, e.g. (;q) = (1
4;1), and low-quality generalist rms, e.g.
(;q) = (1; 1
3) with a slighly higher probability of meeting any given consumer's need. The
click-weighted auction will produce list of low-quality generalist rms. But it would have
been more ecient to have given consumers a list of high-quality specialists. Either list lets
most consumers nd a rm that meets their need and there are many fewer wasted clicks
when consumers get the list of high-quality specialists. One practical application is that
click-weighted auctions may allow rms like eBay and Nextag to win more sponsored-link
slots than would be socially optimal.
The second observation relates to the fact that the unweighted position auction always
has an equilibrium in which rms end up sorted in order of quality. This ordering conveys
28valuable information to consumers. In the click-weighted auction, such equilibria generally
will not exist. Intuitively, consumers will infer that a low  rm that has made it into the
top M rms must have a fairly high q; consumers will therefore sometimes click on such a
rm rst even if it is not at the top of the list; and this makes it hard to get low  rms to
bid for position. Appendix III.A presents some formal results. One notes that equilibria in
which no additional quality information is revealed always exist and are more robust in this
model. Another notes that an equilibrium with quality sorting is possible in one special
case.
VI.C. A New Auction Design: Two-Stage Auctions and Ecient Sorting
To eliminate the information loss due to imperfect sorting one could use a two step
procedure. First, have the rms bid as in the standard click-weighted auction until only
M bidders remain. Then, continue with a second-stage auction allowing bidders to raise
bids further, but using a dierent payment scheme so that the equilibrium will have the
rm with the highest q winning. Appendix III.B presents a formal model illustrating how
this could be done. The mechanism, however, is more complex than a standard position
auction and informational requirements could make it dicult to implement in practice.
VI.D. Obfuscation
A related issue of substantial practical importance is whether the snippet of text that
accompanies each sponsored link conveys useful information about the link. Consumers
benet when the ad text lets them avoid unproductive clicks. And the search engine and
advertisers benet when consumers are more willing to click on seemingly relevant ads. In
this section we discuss advertisers' incentives to make ad text accurate and informative.
We note that click-weighted auctions can create incentives for obfuscation.30
Our formal analysis presented in Appendix section III.C. The model augments our base
model in two ways. First, we assume rms receive some small benet a from each click
regardless of whether the rm meets the consumer's need. This could reect advertising
30See Ellison and Ellison (2004, 2009) for a discussion of obfuscation including a number of examples
involving e-retailers, and Wilson (2008) and Ellison and Wolitzky (2009) for models in which rms inten-
tionally make search more costly.
29revenues, future sales, sales unrelated to the need, or other factors. Second, we model the
endogenous choice of an obfuscation strategy as an ability to choose the fraction i 2 [qi;1]
of consumers who will think after reading the ad text that rm i might meet their need.
We assume that rm i cannot aect the fraction qiof consumers whose needs it will meet,
so choosing a larger i is implicitly choosing a lower probability of meeting the consumer's
need conditional on the ad text being consistent with the need. Consumers cannot observe
obfuscation choices: they believe that each rm is using the equlibrium level of obfuscation.
Our analysis of this model brings out two results:
 There would be no obfuscation in a position auction without click-weighting.
 Firms will engage in obfuscation in the click-weighted auction.
The rst result should be is intuitive { rms do not want unproductive clicks if they have
to pay for them. The easiest way to see this mathematically is to condition on the rm's
position k on the list and normalize the mass of consumers who will click on the rm's link
if it is consistent with their need to one. The rm's revenue from product sales is always qi.
There is an additional benet ia from the extra revenue source. And the rm pays ibk+1
for the clicks it gets. Total prots are qi + i(a   bk+1). This is decreasing in i whenever
bk+1 > a, which will always be true when the rms who don't make the list would have
gotten at least a from each consumer.
The second result is more striking. The key observation is that the formula for per-click
payments in the click-weighted auction, bk+1k+1
i , makes rm i's total payment completely
independent of its clickthrough rate { the total payment is simply equal to bk+1k+1.31 The
gross benet rm i receives from from the clicks it receives, qi + ia, is increasing in the
number of clicks received. So the insensitivity of payments makes rms want to obfuscate
and make the clickthrough rate as large as possible. A feature of this argument that may
make it practically relevant is that it applies even if the benet, a, from unproductive clicks
is very small.
31Immorlica, Jain, Mahdian, and Tulwar (2006) can be seen as showing that this invariance is advantageous
in other dimensions { it makes it possible to generate click-through weights in a way that it resistant to
click fraud.
30Search engines may attempt to combat obfuscation in various ways. One is to try to
enforce rules forbidding misleading ad text by refusing to display ads agged by a manual
or automated review. Another is to adjust the pricing formula either so that rm i's per-
click payment decreases less than one-for-one with increases in the clickthrough rate, or
so that the per-click payment is aected by relevance measures (which can be based on
textual analyses or on the number of consumers who immediately return to the search
page). Pay-per-action auctions are not a solution: the appendix shows that they have the
same obfuscation problem.
VI.E. Product Variety
In practice the consumers who type in a given keyword will have heterogeneous needs.
For example, a consumer who types the keyword \shorts" may be interested in upscale
women's clothing, athletic shorts, or perheps even short lms. Intuitively it would be
desirable to serve such a population by presenting a diverse set of ads. The model we have
presented so far cannot capture this intuition { our assumption that the probability that
each website meets a consumers need is independent rules out the possibility that particular
pairs of sites, e.g. two sellers of athletic shorts, are likely to meet the same needs. Appendix
III.D works through a simple extension of the model in which there are dierent categories
of advertisers. We show that an optimal weighted auction will give a higher weight to sites
that increase product variety. Note that in this context the weight given to site i cannot be
dened just as a function of site i's characteristics: contributions to product variety depend
on the characteristics of the other advertisers who appear on the sponsored-link list.
VI.F. What Does Click-Weighting Mean?
The question of what is meant by the \standard" click-weight is of broader importance.
In the model of section VI.1, the click-weights were assumed to be the (known) parameters
. In practice, click weights will be estimated from data on click-throughs as a function
of rankings. When the relationship between clicks and rankings is not a known function
independent of other website attributes it is not clear what these will mean.
One interesting example is our base model. In this model, suppose that click-through
31rates are estimated via some regression estimated on data obtained when dierent subsets
of rms randomly choose to compete on dierent days. Suppose that each website has the
same q across days. In this situation, the clicks that a given site gets when it is in the
kth position is a decreasing function of its quality. Conditional on k, the quality of sites
1;2;:::;k   1 is higher when qk:N is higher. Hence, the likelihood that consumers will get
down to the kth position without satifying their need is lower.
Using click-weights like this will tend to disadvantage higher-quality sites, reducing both
the average quality of the set of sites presented and eliminating the sorting property of our
base model.
VII. Conclusions
In this paper we have integrated a model of consumer search into a model of auctions
for sponsored-link advertising slots. General observations from previous papers about the
form of the auction equilibrium are not much aected by this extension: advertisers bid up
to their true value to be included in the sponsored-link list and then shade their bids when
competing for a higher rank.
The dierences in the auction environment does, however, have a number of dierent
implications for auction design. One of these is that reserve prices can increase both search-
engine revenues and consumer surplus. The rationality of consumer search creates a strong
alignment between consumer surplus and social welfare in our model and a consumer-surplus
maximizing search engine will have a strong incentive to screen out ads so that consumers
don't lose utility clicking on them. Another set of dierent implications arise when we con-
sider click-through weighting. Here, the auction that is ecient with no search costs ceases
to be ecient for two reasons: it may select the wrong rms and it may provide consumers
with little information to guide their searches. The informational ineciency can be avoided
with an alternate auction mechanism. An additional worry about click-weighted auctions is
obfuscation { since advertisers' steady-state payments do not vary with their click-through
rate (they are determined by the revenue bid of the bidder in the next-lower position),
advertisers have no incentive to design ad text to help consumers avoid unnecessary clicks.
The working paper version of this paper, Athey and Ellison (2009), discusses additional
32auction design questions as well, including policies toward search-diverting sites and the
use of minimum relevance thresholds when consumers are uncertain about the distribution
of advertiser quality.
A more basic theme of our paper is that sponsored link auctions create surplus by
providing consumers with information about the quality of sponsored links. Sorting links
on the basis of weighted bids is an eective mechanism for providing such information. But
once one thinks about search engines as intermediaries whose role is to make consumer
search more ecient, it immediately becomes salient that there could be eective ways
to perform this role with quite dierent designs. For example, search engines could try
to convey ner information about quality. They could try to convey raw data like bids,
conversion rates, or estimated textual relevance, or aggregates of these. Data could be
conveyed numerically or via visual schemes varying the placement, size, or color of ads.
Landing page previews could be added to help consumers assess the relevance of links, etc.
The scope for creative exploration is enormous and should make this an interesting area
for pure and applied research for many years to come.32
32See Rayo and Segal (2010) for one interesting approach to the more abstract question of how consumers
might be provided with information on advertiser quality.
33Appendix I: Uniformly Distributed Quality
This appendix presents some additional results on our model for the case when the the
distribution F of the advertisers' qualities is uniform on [0;1]. This special case is surpris-
ingly tractable. This enables us to derive more explicit versions of several propositions.
A. Consumer Search
The tractability of the model with uniform F stems from the fact that there is a simple
closed form expression for consumers' expectations of the quality of the kth link conditional
on not having found that the rst k   1 links do not meet their need.
Proposition A1 For uniform F, if consumers search an ordered list from the top down,
then
E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0) =
N + 1   k
N + k





Proof: When F is uniform, fk:N(x) = N!
(N k)!(k 1)!(1 x)k 1xN k. The general formula
in Proposition 1 gives
E(qk:Njz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0) =
R 1
0 xfk:N(x)Probfz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0jqk:N = xgdx
R 1
0 fk:N(x)Probfz1 = ::: = zk 1 = 0jqk:N = xgdx
:
The conditional probability that shows up in the numerator and denominator is:






Hence, both the numerator and the denominator are some constant times an integral of the
form
R 1
0 xa(1 x)bdx: Integrating by parts one can show that this is equal to a!b!=(a+b+1)!.
Evaluating the integrals gives the rst formula in the statement of the proposition.
The second formula in the proposition follows from computing the integral that is the
dominator of the above formula or it can be proved more quickly by noting that





1   E(qj:Njz1 = :::zj 1 = 0)

34QED
Having an explicit expression for the conditional expectations makes it easy to give an
explicit description of consumer behavior.
Proposition A2 If the rms are sorted by quality in equilibrium and the distribution F
of rm qualities is uniform, then a consumer with search cost s stops clicking when she










The proof of this result is immediate: the consumer will want to search the kth website
if (N + 1   k)=(N + k) > s. This holds for k < kmax(s).
B. Consumer Welfare
Assuming that the quality distribution is uniform also makes it easy to compute ex-
pected consumer surplus. The expected payo from clicking on the top link is E(q1:N) s =
N=(N+1) s. If the rst link is unsuccessful, which happens with probability 1=(N+1), then
(using Proposition A1) the consumer gets utility E(q2:Njz1 = 0) s = (N  1)=(N +2) s
from clicking on the second. Adding up these payos over the number of searches that will
be done gives the following result:
Proposition A3 If the distribution of rm quality F is uniform, the expected utility of a
consumer with search cost s is:
E(CS(s)) =
8
> > > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > > :















































1   1=2M if s  0
When N is large, the graph of the function above approaches 1   s, whereas the un-
ordered payo is approximately 1   2s. N doesn't need to be very large at all for the
function to be close to its limiting value. For example, just looking at the rst term we
35know that for N = 5 we have E(CS(s)) > 5=6 s for all s. Figure A.1 plots the relationship
between E(CS) and s for N = 4.
C. Clickthrough Rates
If we add an assumption that consumer search costs are also uniformly distributed, then
we also obtain simple explicit expressions for clickthrough rates in our model. Proposition
A4 gives two explicit formulas: one for the expected clickthrough rate; and another for the
conditional expected clickthrough rate when the kth link has quality q. The former might
be compared with data on actual clickthrough rates. The is relevant to the rm's bidding
problem.
Proposition A4 Assume s and q  U[0;1]. Consider an equilibrium of the bidding game
in which rms are sorted in order of quality. Then, the expected number of clicks D(k) that
will be received by the kth website is
D(k) =
1  3    (2k   3)
(N + 1)(N + 2):::(N + k   1)






k 1 N + 1   k
N + k
N + 1   k
N + k
Proof: Expected clickthrough rates can be computed as a product of two terms: the
probability that a consumer's search costs is such that he/she would be willing to click on
the kth link if the he/she does not meet his or her need at the rst k   1 websites; and the
probability that the rst k   1 clicks will all be unsuccessful. With uniformly distributed
search costs the former is simply the expected quality of the kth link conditional on k   1
failures. Hence, the unconditional expected clickthrough rate is simply the product of two
expressions from Proposition A1.
The second expression is derived by thinking of the rst k   1 websites as ordered
at random rather than ordered by decreasing quality. With this reordering, whether the
36probability that each of the k   1 websites meets the consumer's need is independent.
Hence, the probabiilty that none of the k 1 sites meets the need is (1 E(qjjqj > q)k 1 =
((1+q)=2)k 1. The probability that a consumer's search costs is such that she would click
on the website is as in the previous formula.
QED
D. Equilibrium Bidding
Plugging the conditional expectation formula into the formula for equibrium bidding
also yields a formula for equilbrium bidding which simplies.
Proposition A5 When both qualities and search costs are uniform it is a PBE for rms
to choose dropout points according to
b(k;bk+1;q) = bk+1 + (q   bk+1)





(N + 1)2   (k   1)2

:
Proof: The formula is obtained by substituting the expression for G( qk) from Proposi-




(N + 1   k)=(N + k)
(N + 1   (k   1))=(N + (k   1))
= 1  
2N + 1
(N + 1)2   (k   1)2:
QED
E. Optimal Reserve Prices with One-Position Lists
The analysis of the optimal reserve price with a one position list (and uniformly dis-
tributed search costs) also becomes very tractable when the quality distribution is uniform.
Proposition A6 Suppose that the list has one position, the distribution of search costs
is uniform, and the distribution F of rm qualities is also uniform. Then the welfare
maximizing reserve price r is the positive solution to r + r2 + ::: + rN = N=(N + 2):
Proof: Using the decomposition
E(q1:N) = Probfq1:N < rgE(q1:Njq1:N < r) + Probfq1:N > rgE(q1:Njq1:N > r)
we nd that the conditional expectation of the order statistic is:




1   rN :
37The formula follows from the general formula of Proposition 5 after a bit of algebra.
QED
The formula implies that the welfare maximizing reserve price is one-third when N = 1.
With r = 1
3, consumer expectations will be that q  U[1=3;1], and consumers search if and
only if s 2 [0;2=3]. Hence, the average average search costs is indeed 1/3 as the general
formula of Proposition 5 requires.
The expected consumer surplus, search engine prots and social welfare are all higher
with a small positive reserve price than with no reserve price when the quality distribution







2 (1   rN+1)2
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Each of these expressions is increasing in r for small r.
38Appendix II: Reserve prices with nonuniform search
costs
The analysis of reserve prices in the text focuses on the case when the distribution G
of consumer search costs is uniform on [0;1]. In this appendix we present some results
involving general search costs distributions and a gure illustrating the welfare tradeo in
a few examples.
A. Consumer Optimal Reserve Prices
Our rst result is that consumer-surplus maximization does require a positive reserve
price for any G. We prove this by showing that consumer surplus is increased when small
positive reserve prices are implemented.
Proposition A7 Consumer surplus is maximized at a strictly positive reserve price.
Proof:
Consider the eect on consumer surplus of a small increase in r starting from r = 0.
We show that consumer surplus is increased via a two step argument. The simple rst step
is to note that consumer rationality implies that consumer surplus with optimal consumer
behavior is greater than the surplus that consumers would receive if they behaved as if
r = 0.33 The second step is to show that consumer surplus under this \r = 0" behavior is
greater when the search engine uses a small positive reserve price dr than when the search
engine uses r = 0.
If consumers use the r = 0 behavior, then consumer surplus is only aected by the
institution of a reserve price if the reserve price eliminates links from the list and consumers
would have clicked on these links if they were displayed. The gross consumer surplus from
each such click is bounded above by dr. The average search costs incurred on each such
click are bounded below by E(sjs   qM). The cost is independent of dr whereas the benet
is proportional to dr, so the costs dominate for small dr.
QED
B. Social Welfare
33Formally, we suppose that consumers behave exactly as they would if the list had M links and r = 0
when deciding whether to click on any link that is displayed and do not click on links that are not displayed.
39Proposition 5 implies that the socially optimal reserve price is always positive when G
is uniform. Here, we note that social welfare need not be maximized at a positive reserve
price for arbitrary G. An intuition for why reserve prices can be harmful is that consumers
do too little searching from a social perspective because they do not take rm prots into
account. If changes to the reserve price policies decrease the number of clicks that occur in
equilibrium, then social welfare can decrease.
Proposition A8 Social welfare can be strictly greater with a zero reserve price than with
any positive reserve price.
Proof:
Consider a model with M = N = 2 and the quality distribution F is uniform on [0;1].
Suppose that a fraction 1 of consumers have search costs uniformly distributed on [2
3 ; 2
3],
a fraction 2 have search costs uniformly distributed on [0;1] and a fraction 3 have have
search costs uniformly distributed on [0;].
In the rst subpopulation (with s  2
3), small reserve prices reduce welfare. These
consumers click on the rst website but not the second when there is no reserve price.
Hence, the gain in welfare derived from the search engine not displaying a site they would
have clicked on is just O(r2). Small reserve prices also have an eect that works through
changes consumer beliefs: given any small positive r, consumers will not click at all if only
one link is displayed. The expected gross surplus from clicking on a single link is 21+r
2 ,
whereas the search cost incurred is less than 2
3, so losing these clicks is socially inecient.
The probability that this will occur is 2r(1 r) so the loss in social welfare is O(r). Appendix
IV contains a formal derivation of this and shows that the per consumer loss in welfare from
using any reserve price in [0; 1
3   2] is at least 2
3r.
An example using just the rst subpopulation does not suce to prove the proposition
for two reasons: (1) the search cost distribution in this example does not have full support;
and (2) although small reserve prices reduce welfare in the rst subpopulation it turns out
that a larger reserve price (r > 1
3 2) will increase welfare. (The argument above no longer
applies when r is suciently large so that consumers will click on the link when a single
link is displayed.)
40The rst problem is easily overcome by adding a very small fraction 2 of consumers
with search costs uniformly distributed on [0;1]. Welfare gains in this group are rst-order
in r when r is small and bounded when r is large, so adding a suciently small fraction of
such consumers won't aect the calculations.
The second problem is also easily overcome by adding a subpopulation of consumers
with search costs in [0;]. Welfare is improved in this subpopulation when a small positive
reserve price is implemented, but the eect is so weak that we can add a large mass of these
consumers without overturning the small r result from the rst subpopulation.34 There
is a substantial welfare loss in this subpopulation if the search engine uses a large reserve
price. Hence, adding an appropriate mass of these consumers makes the net eect of using
a reserve price of 1
3   2 or greater also negative.
QED
The example used in the proof is obviously quite special. We do not mean to suggest
that the adverse eects of reserve prices are likely to dominate the benecial eects in
the real world. Rather, the motivation for presenting the proposition was simply to note
that one property of socially optimal reserve prices in the model with uniform search costs
cannot be generalized to apply for all G and and to illustrate a channel through which
reserve prices can have a negative impact on social welfare.
C. Reserve Prices
It is also theoretically possible that using a small positive reserve prices can also reduce
search engine revenue. The example we use to demonstrate this highlights another dierence
between our model and standard auction models. The crucial property of these models that
helps drive our examples is that increasing r increases consumer expectations of the quality
of all links, including the bottom one. This makes the Mth position more attractive, which
can reduce bids for the M   1st position. Because bids depend recursively on lower bids,
this can reduce reduce bids on higher positions as well.
Proposition A9 There exist distributions F and G for which search engine revenue is
34The per consumer welfare benet from a small reserve price is bounded above by total search costs
incurred in clicking on ads with quality less than Minfr;g, which is less than 2Minfr;g=2.
41decreasing in the reserve price in a neighborhood of r = 0.
Again, the proof consists of a very special example. Suppose M = N = 2, and all
consumers have search costs of exactly  q2. Assume that with no reserve price consumers
click only on the top link. Hence, rms will bid up to their true value to be in the top
position and and search engine revenue is E(q2:N). Given any positive reserve price r,
consumers will click on both links. The increased attractiveness of the second position
leads to a jump down in bids for the rst position. This, of course, leads to a jump down
in revenue. To see this formally, bids for the rst position (when two rms have q > r) will
satisfy the indierence condition:
(q   b(q)) = (1   q)(q   r):
This gives b(q) = r+q(q r). When r  0 expected revenues are approximately E((q2:N)2).
This is a disrete jump down from E(q2:N).
The example above is not a formal proof of the Proposition for two reasons: (1) the
search cost distribution does not have full support; and (2) we've assumed the search cost
distribution has a mass point at  q2. One could easily modify the example to make it t
within our model. Problem (1) could be overcome by adding a small mass 2 of consumers
with search costs uniformly distributed on [0;1]. And problem (2) could be overcome by
spreading out the rst population to have search costs uniformly distributed on [ q2;  q2 +].
We omit the details of these modications.
D. Numerical Examples of Welfare Tradeos
Figure A.2 illustrates the conicting preferences of advertisers, consumers, and the
search engine in two specications of the model. In each panel, we have graphed expected
advertiser surplus, expected consumer surplus, and expected search engine prot as a func-
tion of the reserve price and drawn vertical lines at the values of r that maximize each of
these functions.
The right panel is for a model with three rms drawn from a uniform quality distribution.
In this model, consumer surplus turns out to be fairly at over a wide range of reserve prices.
The advertiser-optimal and search engine prot-maximizing prices are quite far apart, but
42consumer surplus at both of these points is not very far from its optimum. An intuition for
the atness of the consumer surplus function is that reserve prices in this range are rarely
binding, and hence there is little direct eect on the probability of a link being displayed
and little indirect eect via changes in consumer beliefs. The main eect of a shift from
consumer-optimal to prot-maximizing reserve prices is a redistribution in surplus from
advertisers to the search engine.
The left panel is for a model with three rms with qualities drawn from the CDF
F(q) =
p
q. This distribution is more concentrated on low quality realizations, which
makes consumer surplus and advertiser prots more sensitive to the reserve price in the
relevant range. In each panel we have also graphed an equally weighted average of consumer
surplus and search-engine prot. The curvature of the functions involved is such that the
maximizer of this average is closer to the prot-maxizing level than to the socially optimal
level.
43Appendix III: Click-weighted Auctions
In this appendix we present some additional formal results on click-weighted auctions.
A. Ineciency in the Ordering of Listed Firms
One result highlighting the potential loss of eciency about advertiser qualities is very
simple:
Proposition A10 The click-weighted auction always has an equilibrium in which all re-
maining rms drop out immediately as soon as just M rms remain.
The equilibrium strategies are the obvious ones: rms remain in bidding until the
bid reaches q if there are more than M rms remaining and then drop out immediately
once M rms remain. When rms follow these strategies, consumers' beliefs about the
quality of each remaining rm i conditioning on all available information X is E(qijX) =
EbM+1E(qijiqi > M+1bM+1). This is higher for rms with a lower , so it is an equilibrium
for consumers to ignore the ordering of the rms on the list and search in increasing order
of . With this consumer behavior there is no benet to bidding for a higher position and
immediate drop out is optimal.
Immediate dropout equilibria also existed in the unweighted auction model { all con-
sumers can search in a random order { but we mention them here because they seem more
natural and robust when consumers have reason to believe that some advertisers are better
than others and strictly prefer to search in the way that they do. One robustness criterion
that would distinguish the click-weighted model from the unweighted model is that behav-
ior would not change substantially in the click-weighted model if consumers thought that
there was an  probability that the ordering was informative and a 1    probability that
the ordering was not.35
A second formal result illlustrates that greater information revelation is also possible:
the click-weighted auction model does have an equilibrium with full sorting in one special
case. To dene this, let s be such that all consumers with search costs s < s will search all
35Chen and He (2006) note that the immediate-dropout equilibria in the unweighted mdoel are nonrobust
to assuming that an  fraction of consumers always search in a top down manner. This remains true in the
click-weighted auction.
44listed websites as long as their need has not been met.36
Proposition A11 Suppose that N = M = 2 and the support of the search cost distribution
G is a subset of [0;s]. Then, the click weighted auction has an equilibrium in which the two
rms bid according to b
i(q) = jq2
i . In this equilibrium the rm with the highest q is always
in the rst position on the list.
Proof: Note that the strategies are monotone and satisfy 1b
1(q) = 2b
2(q). Hence,
if rms follow these strategies the winner in a click-weighted auction is the rm with the
highest q. Because all consumers search both rms, rm i's demand is i if it is rst on the
list and its expected demand from the second position (condition on the other rm being
about to drop out) is i(1   jq). Firm i's indierence condition becomes
i(q   b
i(q)) = i(1   jq)(q   0):
This condition is satised for the given bidding function.
QED
The full-sorting example uses several special assumptions. These are largely necessary to
get full sorting. For example, one can show that there are no equilibria with full sorting when
1 6= 2 if one assumes instead that N > 2 and/or that G has full support on [0;1].37 A rough
intuition for this is that the solution to the asymmetric rst-order condition will not satisfy
the symmetry condition necessary for full sorting, ib
i(q) = jb
j(q), except in particular
special cases. Accordingly, we feel that the more important lesson from this section is the
rst one: click-weighted auctions do not have the the nice information-revelation feature of
the unweighted position auction.
B. A New Auction Design: Two-Stage Auctions and Ecient Sorting
Suppose M = 2 and N > 2 and rms 1 and 2 are the remaining rms. To design
an auction in which there will be an equilibrium in which the rms are sorted by quality
it will suce to choose asymmetric payment schedules p1(q) and p2(q) such that it will
36An s > 0 with this property will exist if the 's are bounded away from zero. For example, it suces to
set s = E(q
Mj
M = 1;
1 = ::: = 
M 1 = ;z
1 = z
2 = ::: = z
M 1 = 0):
37We thank Dmitry Taubinsky for these results.
45be an equilibrium for rms to to announce their true qualities q1 and q2 if we ask rms
to announce their qualities, put the rm with the highest announced quality in the rst
position, and assign a per-click payment of pi(q i)) to the winning rm i and b33=j to
the losing rm j.
To see that such payment schedules exist, note that if a rm is the last to drop out, its
expected prot is
1ii(qi   pi(q i));
where 1i = G(E(qijqi > q i;X)) with X the event that rms 1 and 2 are the two winning
bidders. If the rm is the second to drop out, its expected prot is
(2i(1   j) + 3ij(1   q i))i(qi   b33=i);
where 2i = G(E(qijqi < q i;X)) and 3i = G(E(qijqi < q i;X;z i = 0)). It is straight-
forward to choose pi(q) so that these two expressions are equal conditional on q i = qi, in
which case the necessary indierence condition for a truth-telling equilibrium is satised.38
Note that to implement such rules the search engine needs to know the 's and also needs to
know what click-through rates each rm will receive given each possible ordering. Knowing
the 's is necessary for everything we've done in this section. The additional informational
requirements will be more of an obstacle to implementing such schemes in practice.
When s < s for all consumers the payment functions take a particularly simple form:
pi(q) = b33=i +  iq maxf(q   b33=i);0g:
Using this formula we can see that rm 2 is favored at low quality levels when 1 < 2 in the
sense that it makes a lower payment when the rms have equal qualities and these qualities
are near the lowest possible. At high quality levels the bid preference may be reversed.
C. Obfuscation
We augment our base model in two ways. First, we assume that each rm i receives
some benet a from each click it receives independent of whether it meets the consumer's
38One can show that the pi(q) function dened in this way is monotone. Indierence need not hold when
the high  rm drops out at a point when the other rm is known to have higher quality. To complete the
specication without interfering with the selection of the nal two rms we set pi(q) = b
3
3=i if i <  i
and q < b
3
3=i.
46need. Second, we assume that each rm chooses an obfuscation level i 2   [0;1]. If rm
i chooses obfuscation level i then a fraction 1   i of the consumers whose needs will not
be met by the website will realize this just by reading the text of the rm's ad (without
incurring any search costs). We dene i  qi + i(1   qi) to be fraction of consumers who
cannot tell whether site j will meet their need. Note that our base model can be thought
of as a special case of this model with a = 0 and no option other than full obfuscation,
 = f1g.
We assume instead that consumers cannot detect the obfuscation level chosen by any
individual rm. We restrict our analysis to equilibria in which rms are sorted on quality
and consumers search in a top-down manner.
Let k be the fraction of consumers who will click on link k if the rst k   1 links do
not meet their needs and they are in the group that cannot tell whether the kth link meets
their needs. This will be a function of consumer beliefs about the quality of the kth website
and the equilibrium obfuscation strategies.39 One thing that simplies our analysis is that
k does not depend on the actual obfuscation level of the rm in position k.
Consider rst the simplest unweighted pay-per-click auction. Conditional on having
dropped out of the auction at a bid that places rm i in the kth position (k  M), rm i's
payo is
(k;;bk+1;qi) = Xki(qi=i + a   bk+1) = Xk(qi + ia   ibk+1);
where X is the number of consumers who reach position k without having their needs met.
In equilibrium, a small change in i that does not aect rm i's position on the list cannot






(a   bk+1)Xk = (1   qi)(a   bk+1)Xk:
In equilibrium bM+1 will be at least a + qM+1:N, so this is negative and no obfuscation
occurs in equilibrium.
If there was heterogeneity in the benets ai that rms receive from clicks that do
not meet consumers' needs, then it is possible that rms with large ai could engage in
39Note that beliefs about the quality of the k
th rm will no longer be independent of the realized qualities
because consumers will get some information about the qualities of lower-ranked rms by observing whether
these rms can also potentially meet their needs.
47obfuscation. But note that it would still be necessary for ai to be larger than the bid of
the rm in the next highest position, which suggests that obfuscation is unlikely to occur
except perhaps at very low positions on the list.
Consider now a click-weighted pay-per-click auction in which the search engine uses
click-through weights proportional to the i.40 Conditional on being in the kth position
(k  M), rm i's payo is
(k;;bk+1;qi) = Xk






This expression is monotone increasing in i. Hence, in equilibrium we get full obfuscation:
all rms choose i = 1.
Search engines have been developing the capability to track sales made by their adver-
tiser. This enables pay-per-action auctions: rms submit bids bi which represent payments
to be made to the search engine only if a consumer clicks on their link and has their need
met. Suppose that a search engine records the fraction of clicks which result in needs being
met, yi, and uses this as an additional weighting factor just as click-through-rates are used
in the click-weighted auctions: the search engine ranks the rms on the basis of iyibi and
rm i will make a payment of of
k+1yk+1bk+1
iyi every time it meets a need if its ad is displayed
in position k. Conditional on being in the kth position (k  M), rm i's payo is
(k;;bk+1;qi) = Xk






This expression is virtually identical to the expression for the standard click-weighted auc-
tion. The result on obfuscation carries over.
D. Product Variety
We consider here the simplest extension of our model with dierent categories of adver-
tisers. There are three sites: site 1A, site 1B, and site 2. Suppose that a fraction 1 > 1=2
of consumers are type 1 consumers and can potentially have their needs met by both site
1A and site 1B. The remaining 2 = 1 1 consumers are type 2 consumers and can poten-
tially have their needs met only by site 2. Suppose that the sponsored link list contains two
40Note that we are implicitly assuming here that in equilibrium the search-engine has learned rm i's
click-through rate and uses it in determining the rankings and the per-click price rm i must pay.
48rms (M = 2). Assume that the qualities are independent draws from a uniform distribu-
tion on [0;1]. To simplify the analysis we suppose that all consumers have s  0 so that
clicks decline at lower positions only because needs are being met and not also because of
quality-inferences.
Consider a weighted k + 1st price ascending bid auction in which winning bidders are
chosen by comparing b1A, b1B, and wb2. As before assume that the per-click payment of
rm k is the k+1st highest bid adjusted for the weight dierence (if a dierence exists). We
focus on the case of w  1 to discuss when favoring rm 2 is better than equal weighting.
Again, each rm i will bid up to qi to be included on the two-rm list. Once the bidding
is down to two rms, there will again be an equilibrium with full sorting if rms 1A and 1B
are the two remaining rms. When rms 1x and 2 are on the list, however, there cannot be
an equilibrium with full sorting. Because demand is independent of the expected quality of
each site (due to the simplifying assumption that s  0 for all consumers and the fact that
customers served by the two sites are distinct), both rms will drop out immediately.
Given these bidding strategies, suppose that rm 1A is rst on the list and the weight
w is pivotal in determining which other rm appears, i.e. q1B = wq2. Having rm 1B also
on the list provides incremental utility only to type 1 buyers whose needs were not met by
rm 1A. Hence, the expected incremental value of including rm 1B (conditional on q1A) is
1(1 q1A)E(q1Bjq1B < q1A;q1B = wq2) = 1(1 q1A)q1A=2:41 Including rm 2 can provide
incremental utility to any type 2 buyer: the incremental benet is (1   1)E(q2jq1B <
q1A;q1B = wq2) = (1   1)q1A=2w: Using w > 1 will provide greater consumer surplus
than w = 1 if the second term is greater than the rst (in expectation) when w = 1. The
distribution of q1A conditional on q1A being the largest of the three and the other two
satisfying q1B = wq2 is just the distribution of the larger of two uniform [0;1] random
variables. This implies that the conditional expectation of q1A is 2/3 and the conditional
expectation of q2
1A = 1=2. Hence, there is a gain in consumer surplus from choosing w > 1
if 1(1=3   1=4) < (1   1)1=3. We have
Proposition 9 The consumer-surplus maximizing weighted auction is one that favors di-
versity of the listings (w > 1) if 1 < 4=5.
41Conditioning on q1B = wq2 is irrelevant because conditional on wq2 < q1A, wq2 is uniform on [0;q1A].
49Proof
To compute expected consumer surplus we compute the probability that each subset of
rms is listed and the expected quality of the listed rms conditional on that subset being
selected. Write L for the set of rms listed. The main probability fact we need is easy:
ProbfL = f1A;1Bgg = 1=3w
To see this, note that L = f1A;1Bg is possible only if q2 2 [0;1=w]. This happens with
probability 1=w conditional on q2 being in this range, L = f1A;1Bg occurs with probability
1/3 (because wq2 is then uniformly distributed on [0;1]).
The expected qualities are
E(q1xjL = f1A;1Bg;q1x > q1y) =
3
4
E(q1xjL = f1A;1Bg;q1x < q1y) =
1
2
E(q1xjL = f1x;2g) =
8w   3
12w   4
E(q2jL = f1x;2g) =
6w2   1
12w2   4w
The rst two are again identical to the formulas for the unweighted case because this L
only arises when q2 2 [0;1=w] and in this event wq2 is uniformly distributed on [0;1]. The
latter two formulas can be derived fairly easily by conditioning separately on values with
q2 2 [0;1=w] and values with q2 2 [1=w;1]. For example,
E(q1xjL = f1x;2g) =
Prfq2 2 [ 1
w;1]gPrfL = f1x;2gjq2 2 [ 1
w;1]gE(q1xjL = f1x;2g;q2 2 [ 1
w;1])
+Prfq2 2 [0; 1
w]gPrfL = f1x;2gjq2 2 [0; 1
w]gE(q1xjL = f1x;2g;q2 2 [0; 1
w])
Prfq2 2 [ 1
w;1]gPrfL = f1x;2gjq2 2 [ 1
w;1]g
+Prfq2 2 [0; 1
w]gPrfL = f1x;2gjq2 2 [0; 1
w]g
=
(1   1=w)(1=2)(2=3) + (1=w)(1=3)(5=8)
(1   1=w)(1=2) + (1=w)(1=3)



































50The dierence between this expression and the expected consumer surplus from an un-
weighted auction can be put in a relatively simple form by grouping terms corresponding
to cases when the list is unaected by the changes in weights and cases when it is aected.
We nd















































Writing f1(w), f2(w) and g3(w)h3(w) for the three lines of this expression note that all
three terms are equal to zero at w = 1. f2(w) is identically zero. The derivative of the
third evaluated at w = 1 is just dg3=dwjw=1h3(1): After these simplications it takes just







This implies that some w > 1 provides greater consumer surplus than w = 1 provided
that  < 4=5. To complete the proof, we should also work out the equations for consumer




1. The proof contains an explicit formula for consumer surplus that could be maximized
over w to nd the optimal weight for particular values of 1.
2. The sense in which diversity is favored in this proposition is quite strong. The
diversity-providing link is favored in an absolute sense, not just relative to the fraction
of consumers for which it is of interest.
To implement diversity-favoring weights, a search engine would need to infer which
sponsored links contributed to the diversity of a set of oerings. One way to do this
might be to estimate contributions to diversity by looking at whether the likelihood that
51a particular consumer clicks on a particular site is positively or negatively correlated with
whether that consumer clicked on each other site.
What is meant by \standard" click-weighting is not obvious in models like this. One
description of the click-weighted auction one sees in the literature is the weight used is
the estimated CTR conditional on the rm being rst on the list. In the example above,
the CTR's for rms 1A, 1B, and 2 conditional on being rst on the list are 1, 1, and
2, respectively so these standard weights would favor rms 1A and 1B for any 1 > 1=2.
CTR's could also be estimated using an average of observed CTR's from when a rm is in
the rst and second positions. This would still favor rm 2 for a smaller range of 1 than
is optimal, however, because the optimal weights are entirely based on CTR's when rms
are in the second position.
52Appendix IV: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 3
First, we show by induction on k that the specied strategies are dierentiable and
strictly monotone increasing in q and satisfy b(k;bk+1;q)  q on the equilibrium path. For
k = M + 1 this is immediate from b(M + 1;0;q) = q. If it holds for some K > 2 then for
any bK faced by a type q bidder on the equilibrium path we have







 bK + (q   bK) = q:
The inequality here follows from two observations: q bK > 0; and the term in parentheses
is between 0 and 1. (The rst of these follows from the inductive hypothesis via q   bK 
qK:N bK  0 and the second comes from 1 q < 1,  qK 1 <  qK 2, and G strictly monotone.)
To see that the bidding function is dierentiable and strictly monotone increasing in q, one
can compute the derivative and see that it is positive. (The inductive hypothesis is again
used here via q   bK  0:)
We now show that the bidding functions are a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. By the
single-stage deviation principle, it suces to show that no single-stage deviation can increase
the prot of a player i of type qi. We do this by another inductive argument. We rst show
that this is true of deviations in the nal stage (k = 2). And we then show that the
nonexistence of protable deviations at all later stages (all k0 < k) implies that there is also
no protable single stage deviation at stage k.
Consider the nal stage of the game. Suppose rm i has quality qi and that b3 =
b(3;b4;q) so that rm i's belief is that the other active rm has qj  Fjq>q: Firm i's
expected payo as a function of its dropout point ^ q can be written as 1
1 F(q)(qi; ^ q) where
(qi; ^ q) =
 Z ^ q
q
G( q1)(qi   b(3;b3;q))f(q)dq +
Z 1
^ q
G( q2)(1   q)(qi   b3)f(q)dq
!
:
To show that this is maximized at ^ q = qi it suces to show that (qi;qi)   (qi; ^ q)  0 for
all ^ q.
For ^ q  qi we have




G( q1)(qi   b(3;b3;q))   G( q2)(1   q)(qi   b3)

f(q)dq:
53To show that this is nonnegative it suces to show that
G( q1)(qi   b(3;b3;q))  G( q2)(1   q)(qi   b3)
for all q 2 [^ q;qi]. Because the bidding functions are dierentiable and strictly monotone
increasing in q, the argument in the text before the proposition applies and therefore for
each q in this interval the local indierence condition holds:
G( q1)(q   b(3;b3;q)) = G( q2)(1   q)(q   b3)
Subtracting the two equations we nd that it suces to show
G( q1)(qi   q)  G( q2)(1   q)(qi   q):
This is indeed satised for all q 2 [^ q;qi] because G( q1) > G( q2) and (1   q) < 1. The
argument for ^ q > qi is virtually identical. Together, these two cases establish that there is
no protable single-stage deviation in the nal stage.
Suppose now that there are no protable deviations from the given strategies in stages
2;3;:::;k   1 and consider a stage k history with bk+1 = b(k + 1;bk+2;q). To show
that there is no protable single stage deviation, we'll consider separately deviations to
^ b > b(k;bk+1;qi) and deviations to ^ b < b(k;bk+1;qi).
The rst case is quite similar to the argument for k = 2. Deviating to ^ b > b(k;bk+1;qi)
makes no dierence unless player i is eliminated in stage k when he bids b(k;bk+1;qi) and
is not eliminated when he bids ^ b. Hence for all relevant realizations of the k   1st highest
quality, player i will be the rst to drop out in stage k 1 if he then follows the equilibrium





(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)(1   q)jqk 1:N = q







(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)jqk 1:N = q

 G( qk 1)  (qi   b(k;bk+1;q))f(q)dq;
where ^ q is the solution to b(k;bk+1; ^ q) = ^ b. (A solution to this exists because the bidding
functions are dierentiable and approach 1 in the limit as q ! 1.) As above, this will be
nonnegative if
(1   q)G( qk)(qi   bk+1)  G( qk 1)(qi   b(k;bk+1;q))
54for all q 2 [qi; ^ q]. Subtracting the local indierence condition from the two sides of this
equation we again obtain that a sucient condition is
(1   q)G( qk)(qi   q)  G( qk 1)(qi   q) 8q 2 [qi; ^ q]:
This will hold because qi   q < 0 and 0 < (1   q)G( qk) < G( qk 1):
The argument for deviations to ^ b < b(k;bk+1;qi) is just a little more complicated. In
this case, the deviation makes no dierence unless player i is eliminated in stage k when
he bids ^ b and is not eliminated at this stage when he bids b(k;bk+1;qi). We show that
the change in payo is not positive by a two-step argument: we show that that the payo
from dropping out at ^ b is worse than the payo from bidding b(k;bk+1;qi) at stage k and
then dropping out immediately in stage k   1; and that this in turn is less than the payo
from bidding b(k;bk+1;qi) at stage k and then following the given strategies. The latter






(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)jqk 1:N = q







(1   q1:N)(1   q2:N)(1   qk 2:N)(1   q)jqk 1:N = q

 G( qk)  (qi   bk+1)f(q)dq
is nonnegative where ^ q < qi is the solution to b(k;bk+1; ^ q) = ^ b. This is just like the
argument for the ^ q  qi case above. The expresion is nonnegative if
G( qk 1)(qi   b(k;bk+1;q))  (1   q)G( qk)(qi   bk+1)
for all q 2 [^ q;qi]. Subtracting the local indierence condition from the two sides of this
equation we again obtain that a sucient condition is
G( qk 1)(qi   q)  (1   q)G( qk)(qi   q) 8q 2 [^ q;qi]:
This will hold because qi   q > 0 and 0 < (1   q)G( qk) < G( qk 1):
This completes the proof that there is no protable deviation at stage k and the result
follows by induction.
QED
55Additional Details on the Proof of Proposition A8
With no reserve price, consumers with search costs in [2
3   ; 2
3] will click only on the

















Suppose now that the search engine uses a small positive reserve price r. (More precisely
assume r 2 (0; 1
3   2)). These consumers now click on the rst link only if two links are
displayed. Per consumer social welfare becomes





































For somewhat larger r, specically r 2 [1
3   2; 5
9   4
3], consumers in the high search
cost group will click on the top link even if only one link is displayed. In the high search
cost population per-consumer welfare is now
W = (2E(q1:Njq2:N  r)   s)(1   r)2 + (2E(q1:Njq1:N > r;q2:N < r)2r(1   r):
Using this, we one can show that the per consumer welfare gain in the high-search cost
subpopulation is at most 2
3r2(1 2r). This is negative for r > 1
2 and is uniformly bounded
above by 2
81. Computing the mass of needs that go unmet because of the reserve price that
would have been met without a reserve price we nd that the per consumer loss in welfare




4 ) 22. It is easy
to choose 1 and 3 so that this outweighs any gains in the high-search costs population
whenever r  1
3   2.
For even larger r the high search cost consumers will be willing to search both sites
when two are listed. But again, one can show that the welfare losses in the low search cost
population will outweigh this.
QED
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Consumer surplus with sorted and unsorted links: N = 4
60Figure A.2
Welfare and distribution of surplus for two specications
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